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Abstract
The problem of least square approximation for set functions by set func-
tions satisfying specified linear equality or inequality constraints is con-
sidered. The problem has important applications in the field of pseudo-
Boolean functions, decision making and in cooperative game theory, where
approximation by additive set functions yields so-called least square values.
In fact, it is seen that every linear value for cooperative games arises from
least square approximation. We provide a general approach and problem
overview. In particular, we derive explicit formulas for solutions under mild
constraints, which include and extend previous results in the literature.
Keywords: least square approximation, cooperative game, pseudo-Boolean func-
tion, least square value, Shapley value, probabilistic value
JEL Classification: C71
1 Introduction
Approximation of high-dimensional quantities or complicated functions by sim-
pler functions with linear properties from low-dimensional spaces has countless
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applications in physics, economics, operations research etc. In these applications,
the quality of the approximation is usually measured by the Gaussian principle
of the least squared error, which is also the guiding optimality criterion in the
present investigation. Our study addresses a particular case of such an approx-
imation context with many applications in different fields related to operations
research, namely decision theory, game theory and the theory of pseudo-Boolean
functions.
Where N is a finite set with n = |N | elements and collection 2N of subsets,
a set function v : 2N → R assigns to every subset of N a real number, and is by
definition of exponential complexity (in n). Identifying subsets of N with their
characteristic (incidence) vectors (and thus 2N with {0, 1}n), a set function can
be viewed as a so-called pseudo-Boolean function f : {0, 1}n → R (cf. Hammer
and Rudeanu [11]). Of particular interest are those set functions which vanish on
the empty set, since they represent cooperative TU games with N being the set
of players and the quantities v(S) expressing the benefit created by the coopera-
tion of the members of S ⊆ N (see, e.g., Peleg and Sudho¨lter [13]). Under the
additional stipulation of monotonicity, i.e., the property that v(S) ≤ v(T ) holds
whenever S ⊆ T , one arrives at so-called capacities, which are a fundamental
tool in the analysis of decision making under uncertainty (cf. Schmeidler [16]) or
relative to several criteria (Grabisch and Labreuche [7]).
Being of exponential complexity, a natural question is to try to approximate
general set functions by simpler functions, the simplest being the additive set func-
tions, which are completely determined by the value they take on the empty set
∅ and on the n singleton sets {i} and are thus of linear complexity (in n). In the
field of pseudo-Boolean functions, the question has been addressed by Hammer
and Holzman [9] with respect to linear and quadratic approximations, while ap-
proximation of degree k was studied by Grabisch et al. [8]. In decision theory,
linear approximation amounts to the approximation of a capacity µ by a prob-
ability measure P (an additive capacity satisfying the additional constraint that
P (N) = 1).
In game theory, the approximation of a game v by an additive game (equiva-
lently by a (payoff) vector in RN ) is related to the concept of value or solution of
a game: given v, find x ∈ RN such that
∑
i∈N xi = v(N) and the xi represent as
faithfully as possible the contribution of the individual players i in the total benefit
v(N). A very natural approach for a value is to define it as the best least square
approximation of v, under the constraint
∑
i∈N xi = v(N), the approximation be-
ing possibly weighted. Such values are called least square values. An early and
2
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important contribution to this cooperative solution concept is due to Charnes et al.
[2], who gave the general solution for the weighted approximation with nonneg-
ative weights, and exhibited the well-known Shapley value [17] as a least square
value. Ruiz et al. [14], for example, generalized this approach and derived further
values from least square approximation.
The aim of this paper is to provide a clear, rigorous and general view of the
approximation problem for set functions by placing it in the context of quadratic
optimization and bringing the tools of convex analysis to bear on the problem.
This approach not only generalizes existing results but also points to interesting
connections and facts. Our formulation will remain general, although we will
adopt most of the time the notation and ideas from cooperative game theory, due
to the great interest in this field towards values and how to obtain them.
For example, it is seen that approximation under linear inequality constraints
generalizes the idea of the core of a cooperative game in a natural way and gives
rise to values that are conic – but not necessarily linear (see the core values in
Section 2.4). Under linear equality constraints, we find that every least square
problem yields a linear value and that every linear value arises as a least square
value (Section 2.3).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 settles the general problem of
least square approximation and gives the most fundamental results which will
be useful in the sequel. In particular, it is seen how linear (or more generally,
conic) values arise from least square approximation. Section 3 concentrates on
least square values, and establishes explicit solution formulas under mild con-
straints on the weights used in the approximation with application to the Shapley
value and to an optimization problem given in Ruiz et al. [14]. (Interestingly, the
weights do not necessarily have to be all positive under our constraints.) Finally,
Section 4 shows howWeber’s [19] so-called probabilistic values arise naturally in
our model.
2 Least square approximations
We begin by reviewing some basic facts from convex optimization1. For integers
k,m ≥ 1, we denote byRk the vector space of all k-dimensional (column) vectors
and by Rm×k the vector space of all (m × k)-matrices. The standard (euclidian)
1see, e.g., Faigle et al. [4] or any other textbook for more details
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inner product on Rk is given as
〈x|y〉 = xTy (x, y ∈ Rk).
Let B ∈ Rk×k be a matrix of full rank k so that the columns of B form a basis of
R
k. Then the basis (coordinate) change x = Bx yields the inner product
〈x|y〉Q = 〈Bx|By〉 = x
TQy with Q = BTB.
Recall from linear algebra that Q is a positive definite matrix and that every posi-
tive definite matrix P is of the form P = CTC for some C ∈ Rk×k of full rank.
The associated norm is
‖x‖Q =
√
〈x|x〉Q =
√
xTQx = ‖Bx‖.
The standard norm ‖x‖ = ‖x‖I corresponds to the choice Q = I as the identity
matrix.
2.1 Approximation and quadratic optimization
Recall that a polyhedron P in Rk is a subset of the form
P = P (A, b) = {x ∈ Rk | Ax ≥ b},
where A ∈ Rm×k and b ∈ Rm for somem ≥ 1. The (least square) approximation
problem of c ∈ Rk relative to P is
min
x∈P
‖c− x‖2 = 〈c|c〉 − 2〈c|x〉+ 〈x|x〉. (1)
Assuming P = P (A, b) 6= ∅, it is well-known that (1) has a unique optimal
solution cˆ, which can be computed by solving the associated Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) system
x − AT y = c
Ax ≥ b
y ≥ 0.
(2)
Reformulating the approximation problem (1) with respect to the Q-norm, we
arrive at
min
x:Ax≥b
‖c− x‖2Q = 〈c|c〉Q − 2〈c|x〉Q + 〈x|x〉Q. (3)
4
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with A = AB and the KKT system
Qx − A
T
y = Qc
Ax ≥ b
y ≥ 0.
(4)
Finally, setting c˜ = Qc and observing that 〈c|c〉Q is a constant, we note that the
approximation problem (1) is equivalent with the quadratic optimization problem
under linear constraints
min
x:Ax≥b
xTQx− 2c˜Tx. (5)
The optimal solutions of (5) are obtained from the KKT system
Qx − A
T
y = c˜
Ax ≥ b
y ≥ 0.
(6)
2.2 Conic maps from quadratic optimization
Let N be a set of n players and denote by N = 2N the family of all coalitions
S ⊆ N . Recall that a cooperative TU game on N is described by a characteristic
function v : N → R that is zero-normalized in the sense v(∅) = 02.
Clearly, linear combinations of characteristic functions yield characteristic
functions. So the collection G = G(N) of all characteristic functions forms a
(2n − 1)-dimensional vector space relative to the field R of scalars.
We call a map f : G → Rk conic if f is additive and positively homogeneous,
i.e., if for all v, w ∈ G and scalars λ ≥ 0,
f(v + w) = f(v) + f(w) and f(λv) = λf(v).
Consider a fixed constraint matrix A ∈ Rm×k and a positive definite matrix
Q ∈ Rk×k. Let furthermore c : G → Rk and b : G → Rm be linear operators such
that Ax ≥ b(v) has a solution for every v. Denote by vˆ the optimal solution of the
quadratic (approximation) problem
min
x:Ax≥b(v)
xTQx− 2c(v)Tx. (7)
Our key observation is now the following:
2The condition v(∅) = 0 is in fact not a restriction in our optimization problem, as this term
does not play any role. Therefore, our results concern any type of set function.
5
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Lemma 2.1 (Conicity lemma) v 7→ vˆ is a conic map from G into Rk.
Proof. Let v, w ∈ G and λ ≥ 0 be arbitrary. So vˆ and wˆ satisfy the associated
KKT system
Qx − ATy = c(v)
Ax ≥ b(v)
y ≥ 0.
It is straightforward to verify that vˆ + wˆ and λvˆ satisfy the KKT system relative
to v + w and λv.
⋄
REMARK. For Lemma 2.1 to remain valid, one can relax the linearity hypo-
thesis. For c, it is enough to require conicity. For b, subadditivity and positive
semi-homogeneity is sufficient:
b(v) + b(v) ≥ b(v + w) and λb(v) ≥ b(λv)
for all v, w ∈ G and λ ≥ 0.
2.3 Linear equality constraints
In the case of linear constraints of type Ax = b, the solution space is an affine
subspace of Rk and the KKT system of the optimization problem
min
x
xTQx− 2cTx s.t. Ax = b
becomes the linear equality system
Qx − ATy = c
Ax = b.
(8)
Hence we conclude
Proposition 2.1 Assume that c : G → Rk and b : G → Rm are linear operators
such that Ax = b is always solvable. Then v 7→ vˆ is a linear map.
⋄
Notice that the linear maps arising in the manner of Proposition 2.1 are not
special. In fact, every linear map f : G → Rk can be obtained in this way. To see
6
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this, observe that f(v) is (trivially) the unique optimal solution of the approxima-
tion problem
min
x∈Rk
‖f(v)− x‖2 = ‖f(v)‖2 − 2f(v)Tx+ ‖x‖2.
So f(v) is the unique optimal solution of the quadratic problem
min
x
xTQx− 2cTx with Q = I and c = f(v).
2.4 Examples
In the case k = n = |N |, a map Φ : G → Rn is called a value in cooperative game
theory. So the discussion around Proposition 2.1 shows that linear values arise
from least square approximation (or quadratic minimization) problems relative to
linear constraints. For example, the value Φ is said to be efficient if it satisfies the
restriction ∑
i∈N
Φi(v) = v(N),
which is linear in v.
The concept of values can be refined by considering the space RN of all maps
N → R. The additive (cooperative) games correspond to exactly those x ∈ RN
that satisfy the homogeneous system of linear equations
x(S)−
∑
i∈S
xi = 0 (S ∈ N )
and one may be interested in the approximation of a game function v by an ad-
ditive game with certain properties. More general approximations might be of
interest. For example, the linear constraints∑
i∈N
xi = v(N)
∑
S∈N
xS =
∑
S∈N
v(S)
would stipulate an approximation of v by a game that induces an efficient value
(the first equality) and, furthermore, preserves the total sum of the v(S) (second
equality).
7
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Inequality constraints Ax ≥ b connect the idea of values naturally with the
notion of the core of a cooperative game. Consider, for example, the system of
core inequalities ∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) (S ∈ N ),
which is clearly always solvable. So Lemma 2.1 guarantees the existence of a
conic (but not necessarily linear) map v 7→ vˆ, where vˆ is the solution of the least
square approximation problem
min
x
‖v − x‖2 s.t.
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊆ N,
inducing the core value Γ : G → RN , with components
Γi(v) = vˆi (i ∈ N),
for the class G of cooperative TU games.
REMARK. The core value is studied with respect to decomposition properties
of convex games in Fujishige [6].
3 Least square values
We have seen that every linear value Φ : G → RN can be interpreted as arising
from a least square approximation problem. Special cases of seemingly more
general least square problems have received considerable attention in the literature
and led to the concept of least square values and semivalues. Take, for example,
the weighted least square problem
min
x∈RN
∑
S∈N
αS(v(S)− x(S))
2 s.t.
∑
i∈N
xi = v(N), (9)
where we set x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi. So (9) asks for the best (α-weighted) least square
approximation of a game v by an additive game x under the additional efficiency
constraint x(N) = v(N).
This problem has a long history. Hammer and Holzman ([9])3 studied both the
above version and the unconstrained version with equal weights (αS = 1 ∀S), and
3later published in [10]
8
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proved that the optimal solutions of the unconstrained version yield the Banzhaf
value [1] (see also Section 4 below). More general versions of the unconstrained
problem were solved by Grabisch et al. [8] with the approximation being relative
to the space of k-additive games (i.e., games whose Mo¨bius transform vanishes
for subsets of size greater than k)4.
In 1988, Charnes et al. [2] gave a solution for the case with the coefficients
αS being uniform (i.e., αS = αT whenever |S| = |T |) and strictly positive. As a
particular case, the Shapley value was shown to result from the coefficient choice
αS = αs =
(
n− 2
s− 1
)
=
(n− 2)!
(s− 1)!(n− 1− s)!
(s = |S|). (10)
REMARK. Ruiz et al. [14] state that problem (9) has a unique optimal solu-
tion for any choice of weights (see Theorem 3 there). In this generality, however,
the statement is not correct as neither the existence nor the uniqueness can be
guaranteed. So additional assumptions on the weights must be made.
We will first present a general framework for dealing with such situations and
then illustrate it with the example of regular weight approximations and proba-
bilistic values.
3.1 Weighted approximation
For the sake of generality, consider a general linear subspace F ⊆ RN of dimen-
sion k = dimF , relative to which the approximation will be made.
LetW = [wST ] ∈ RN×N be a givenmatrix of weightswST . Let c : RN → RN
be a linear function and consider, for any game v, the optimization problem
min
u∈F
(v − u)W (v − u)T + c(v − u)T with c = c(v), (11)
which is equivalent with
min
u∈F
uWuT − c˜uT , (12)
where c˜ ∈ RN has the components c˜S = cS + 2
∑
T wSTvT . A further simpli-
fication is possible by choosing a basis B = {b1, . . . , bk} for F . With the identifi-
cation
x = (x1, . . . , xk) ∈ R
k ←→ u =
k∑
i=1
xibi ∈ F ,
4see also Ding [3], and Marichal and Mathonet [12]
9
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problem (12) becomes
min
x∈Rk
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
qijxixj −
k∑
i=1
cixi (13)
with the coefficients
qij =
∑
S
∑
T
wST bi(S)bj(T ) and ci =
∑
S
c˜Sbi(S).
Note that c : RN → Rk is a linear function.
Let A ∈ Rm×k be a constraint matrix and b : RN → Rm a linear function
such that Ax = b(v) has a solution for every v ∈ RN . If Q = [qij ] ∈ Rk×k is
positive definite, the problem
min
x∈Rk
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
qijxixj −
k∑
i=1
cixi s.t. Ax = b (14)
has a unique optimal solution x∗ which is linear in v (Proposition 2.1). So we
obtain the a linear value v 7→ vˆ with components
vˆj = u
∗
{j} (j ∈ N) , where u
∗ =
k∑
i=1
x∗i bi ∈ F .
In the model (9), for example, F is the space C of all additive games and has
dimension n. The matrixW is diagonal with the diagonal elements wSS = αS . If
αS > 0 holds for all S, thenW is positive definite and the linearity of the implied
value v 7→ vˆ follows directly from Proposition 2.1.
Otherwise, let us choose for B the basis of unanimity games ζi, i ∈ N , for C,
where
ζi(S) =
{
1 if i ∈ S,
0 if i 6∈ S.
The associated matrix Q = [qij ] in model (9) has the coefficients
qij =
∑
S∈N
αSζi(S)ζj(S) =
∑
S∋{i,j}
αS. (15)
For establishing a linear value, it suffices that Q be positive definite, which is
possible even when some of the αS are negative (see Examples 3.1 and 3.2 below).
10
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3.2 Regular weights
While Proposition 2.1 guarantees the existence of linear values resulting from
approximation, explicit formulas can be given under additional assumptions on
the weights. Restricting ourselves to objectives of type∑
S∈N
αS(vS − uS)
2 +
∑
S∈N
cSuS,
we propose a simple framework that nevertheless includes all the cases treated in
the literature so far. We say that the weights αS are regular if the resulting matrix
Q has just two types of coefficients qij , i.e., if there are real numbers p, q such that
qij =
{
q if i = j
p if i 6= j.
Example 3.1 Assume that the weights αS are uniform and set α(|S|) = αS . Then
formula (15) yields
qij =
n∑
s=2
(
n− 2
s− 2
)
α(s) and qii =
n∑
s=1
(
n− 1
s− 1
)
α(s)
holds for all i 6= j. So Q = [qij ] is regular.
Lemma 3.1 Let Q = [qii] ∈ Rk×k be regular with q = qii and p = qij for i 6= j.
Then Q is positive definite if and only if q > p ≥ 0.
Proof. For any x ∈ Rk, we have after some algebra
xTQx = (q − p)
k∑
i=1
x2i + px
2
where x =
∑n
i=1 xi, which makes the claim of the Lemma obvious.
⋄
Note that our model allows for possibly negative uniform coefficients, as shown
in the following example.
11
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Example 3.2 Let n = 3. We get p = α2 + α3 and q = α1 + 2α2 + α3. Letting
α > 0, the following vectors (α1, α2, α3) lead to a positive definite matrix Q:
(0, α, 0), (α, 0, α), (0, α,−α), etc.
For the remainder of this section, let Q ∈ RN×N be a regular matrix with
parameters q > p ≥ 0, c ∈ RN a vector and g ∈ R a scalar. Setting 1T =
(1, 1, . . . , 1), the optimization problem
min
x∈RN
xTQx− cTx s.t. 1Tx = x(N) = g (16)
has a unique optimal solution x∗ ∈ RN . Moreover, there is a unique scalar z∗ ∈ R
such that (x∗, z∗) is the unique solution of the associated KKT-system
Qx − z1 = c/2
1
Tx = g.
(17)
Verifying this KKT-system, the proof of the following explicit solution formu-
las is straightforward.
Theorem 3.1 If Q is regular, the solution (x∗, z∗) of the KKT-system (17) is:
z∗ = (2(q + (n− 1)p)g − C)/n (with C = c1T =
∑
i∈N ci)
x∗i = (ci + z
∗ − 2pg)/(2q − 2p) (i ∈ N).
If Q is furthermore positive definite, then x∗ is an optimal solution for (16).
⋄
In the case of uniform weights α(s), the formulas in Theorem 3.1 yield the
formulas derived by Charnes et al.[2] for problem (9). To demonstrate the scope
of Theorem 3.1, let us look at the extremal problem5 studied by Ruiz et al. [15]
min
x∈RN
∑
S⊆N
mSd(x, S)
2 s.t. x(N) = v(N), (18)
wheremS > 0 and
d(x, S) =
v(S)− x(S)
|S|
−
v(N \ S)− x(N \ S)
n− |S|
.
5see also Sun et al. [18] for similar problems
12
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Letting v∗(S) = v(N)− v(N \ S) and
v(S) =
(n− |S|)v(S) + |S|v∗(S)
n
(and thus nv(N) = v(N)), we find that problem (18) becomes
min
x∈RN
∑
S⊆N
αS(v(S)− x(S))
2 s.t. x(N) = nv(N).
with αS = n
2mS(|S|2(n− |S|)2)−1. Because v 7→ v and v 7→ g(v) = nv(N) are
linear mappings, the optimal solutions of (18) yield an efficient linear value for
any choice of parametersmS such that the associated matrixQ is positive definite.
If furthermore the weightsmS (and hence the αS) are uniform,Q is regular and
the optimal solution can be explicitly computed from the formulas of Theorem 3.1.
4 Probabilistic values
Weber [19] introduced the idea of a probabilistic value arising as the expected
marginal contribution of players relative to a probability distribution on the coali-
tions. For example, a semivalue is a probabilistic value relative to probabilities
that are equal on coalitions of equal cardinality.
For our purposes, it suffices to think of themarginal contribution of an element
i ∈ N as a linear functional ∂i : G → R, where ∂vi (S) is interpreted as the
marginal contribution of i ∈ N to the coalition S ⊆ N relative to the characteristic
function v.
Probabilistic values can be studied quite naturally in the context of weighted
approximations. Indeed, let p be an arbitrary probability distribution on N . Then
the expected marginal contribution of i ∈ N relative to the game v is
E(∂vi ) =
∑
S⊆N
∂vi (S)pS.
Let µi ∈ R be an estimate value for the marginal contribution of i ∈ N . Then
the expected observed deviation from µi is
σ(µi) =
√∑
S∈N
pS(∂
v
i (S)− µi)
2.
13
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A well-known fact in statistics says that the deviation function µi 7→ σ(µi) has
the unique minimizer µ = E(∂vi ), which can also be immediately deduced from
the KKT conditions for the least square problem
min
µ∈R
∑
S∈N
pS(∂
v
i (S)− µ)
2.
The values of Shapley and Banzhaf. Shapley’s [17] model assumes that player
i contributes to a coalition S only if i ∈ S holds and that, in this case, i’s marginal
contribution is evaluated as
∂vi (S) = v(S)− v(S \ i).
So only coalitions in Ni = {S ⊆ N | i ∈ S} need to be considered. In order to
speak about the ”average marginal contribution”, the model furthermore assumes:
(i) The cardinalities |X| of the coalitionsX ∈ Ni are distributed uniformly.
(ii) The coalitions X ∈ Ni of the same cardinality |X| = s are distributed
uniformly.
Under these probabilistic assumptions, the coalition S ∈ Ni of cardinality
|S| = s occurs with probability
pS =
1
n
·
1(
n−1
s−1
) = (s− 1)!(n− s)!
n!
, (19)
which exhibits the Shapley value as a probabilistic (and hence approximation)
value: ∑
S∈Ni
pS[v(S)− v(S \ i)] =
∑
S∈N
pS[v(S)− v(S \ i)] = Φ
Sh
i (v).
REMARK. Among the probabilistic values, the Shapley value can also be char-
acterized as the one with the largest entropy (Faigle and Voss [5]).
In contrast to the Shapley model, the assumption that all coalitions in Ni are
equally likely assigns to any coalition S ∈ Ni the probability
pS =
1
2n−1
(20)
with the Banzhaf value [1] as the associated probabilistic value:∑
S∈Ni
pS[v(S)− v(S \ i)] =
∑
S∈N
pS[v(S)− v(S \ i)] = B
v
i .
14
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